emergency_access_update

Bypasses timelock for emergency access changes such as disabling a delegate, integration, or state.

Differs from production — this staging instruction differs from GLAM Protocol: emergency_access_update in: policy & permissions.

Required conditions

The update must be limited to emergency access actions: removing an integration, removing a delegate, or enabling or disabling the GLAM state.

Account	Role	Description
glam_state	writable	GLAM state account that stores vault configuration, integration ACLs, delegate permissions, policies, assets, mint linkage, and pricing records.
glam_signer	signer, writable	Calling authority or fee payer.

Argument	Type	Notes
args	EmergencyAccessUpdateArgs

Caller: GLAM owner, or a delegate with System EmergencyUpdate permission.
Allowed actions: remove an integration, remove a delegate, or enable or disable the GLAM state.
A pure veto delegate — one whose only permission is GLAM Protocol / System / CancelTimelock — cannot be removed through this path; the emergency update is rejected. Its sole purpose is to cancel pending timelocked updates (it does not affect the timelock mechanism itself), so it stays in place to preserve the veto capability.
Delegates that hold CancelTimelock together with any other permission are not protected by this guard.